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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
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PIERRE J. SAVIERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 40503
BLAINE COUNTY NO. CR 2012-368

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pierre J. Saviers requests that this Court grant review in this matter, which
relates to the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in State v. Sa viers, Docket Number
40503,2014 Published Opinion No. 13 (Feb. 20, 2014) ("Opinion"). Review should be
granted as this case presents an issue of first impression for this Court and the Court of
Appeals.

In the Opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals held that the

district court did not err when it determined that Mr. Saviers' two prior convictions for
violating a no-contact order, to which he pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced
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on the same day, could not be considered as one conviction for the purposes of the
felony enhancement provided for in I.C. § 18-920(3). Or in other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the holding from State v. Brandt,
110 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that when multiple felony convictions entered on
the same day or charged in the same information they should be treated as one
conviction for the purposes of the persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514), to
I.C. § 18-920(3).
Review should also be granted because the Opinion is inconsistent with the
Court of Appeals' holding in Brandt.

In the Opinion, the Court of Appeals refused to

extend the Brandt rule to I.C. § 18-920(3), because it determined that the legislative
intent behind the persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514, is "markedly different" from
the legislative intent behind I.C. § 18-920(3).

(Opinion, pp.4-5.)

Specifically, it

reasoned that I.C. § 19-2514 favors rehabilitation between criminal offenses, providing
criminal defendants an opportunity to reform in light of enhanced penalties, while
I.C. § 18-920(3) does not allow for rehabilitation between offenses and was intended to
punish repetitive misdemeanor violators harshly regardless of the time between
offenses.

(Opinion, pp.4-5.)

However, in a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted it

would consider applying the Brandt Rule to I.C. § 18-920(3) if the prior violations of a
no-contact order occur on the same day and/or are charged in the same information.
(Opinion, p.5 n.3.) This is inconsistent with Brandt because in that case the Court of
Appeals adopted the Brandt rule then refused to apply to the facts of that case. Either
the legislative intent of I.C. § 19-2514 and I.C. § 18-920(3) are similar and the Brandt
rule should have been applied to I.C. § 18-920(3) or they are dramatically different, as
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held in the Opinion, and the Brandt rule should not

extend to I.C. § 18-920(3). The

fact pattern of an individual case does not alter the legislative intent of a statute.

Staternent of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Saviers was very depressed and tried to kill himself by shooting himself in the
chest. (05/26/11 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.7.) When Mr. Saviers was coming out of the
coma, that resulted from his suicide attempt, his wife got him to sign a divorce decree
awarding her all of his assets. (05/26/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-10; 10107/11 Tr., p.65, LS.1518; 10/11/11 Tr., p.94, L.i8

p.95, L.1.) Mr. Saviers said that at the time he signed the

divorce decree his cognitive functioning was so low he could not count backwards from
seven and did not know the name of the current president. (06/23/11 Tr., p.36, LS.912.) His former wife was aware of the fact Mr. Saviers didn't know what he was signing.
(06/23/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.18-24.) According to his counsel at the time, H[s]he took the

house, she took everything.

And I have read that decree.

It is not ethically legaL"

(05/26/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.7-8.)
As a result of other criminal charges related to his depression, failed suicide
attempt, and divorce, a magistrate entered a no contact order between Mr. Saviers and
his former wife.

(04/13/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17; 07/08/11 Tr., p.46, Ls.22-46.) In two

different cases, Mr. Saviers was charged with two misdemeanor counts of violation of
the no contact order, one of which occurred on July 7, 2011, and the other on June 21,
2011.1 (07/08/11 Tr., p.44, Ls.9-14, p.46, L.22 - p.47, L.9.) At a consolidated hearing,
Mr. Saviers pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges of violating a no contact order.

The State also alleged that Mr. Saviers violated the no contact order on May 26, 2011.
(07/08/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.2-3.) However, the State dismissed that charge. (07/08/11
Tr., p.47, Ls.3-4.)
1
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(10/11/11 Tr., p.79, Ls.11-18.) At that same hearing, Mr. Saviers was sentenced on
both of the no contact order cases and the magistrate continued the no contact order.

(10/11/11 Tr., p.109, Ls.12-14, p.112, Ls.2-24.)
Mr. Saviers was subsequently charged, by information, with violation of the no
contact order. (R., pp.40-41.) The State also filed a felony enhancement based on the
two convictions in the foregoing cases. (R., pp.40-41.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Mr. Saviers pleaded guilty to violating the no contact order and admitted to the two prior
violations of the no contact order. (05/23/12 Tr., p.5, L.8-24.) Mr. Saviers did not plead
guilty to the felony enhancement; rather, a bench trial was held to decide a legal issue,
namely, whether the two prior convictions for violating the no contact order constituted
one or two convictions for purposes of the felony enhancement. (05/23/12 Tr., p.7, L.24
- p.8, L.7.) Mr. Saviers argued, in reliance on State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 (Ct. App.
1986), and its progeny, that the two convictions should only constitute one conviction for
enhancement purposes, as they relateed to the same victim and were adjudicated at
the same hearing. (See generally 05/30/12 Tr.) Based on a line of cases involving the
crime of driving under the influence (hereinafter, QUI), the district court concluded that
Mr. Saviers' act was a felony. (See generally 06/18/12 Tr.) Thereafter, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but suspended that
sentence and placed Mr. Saviers on probation.

(R., pp.81-85.)

Mr. Saviers timely

appealed. (R., pp.95-97.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the Brandt rule to I.C. § 18920(3) because it determined that the persistent violator statue, I.C. § 19-2514, had
different policy goals than I.e. § 18-920(3). (Opinion, pp.4-5.) However, the Court of
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Appeals indicated that it would consider applying the holding from Brandt to I.C. § 18920(3) if it was presented with an appeal that had what it determined to be an
appropriate fact pattern. (Opinion, p.5 n.3.)
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ISSUE
Should review be granted, as the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Saviers'
Judgment of Conviction decided an issue of first impression and is inconsistent with a
prior Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion?

6

ARGUMENT
Review Should Be Granted As The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming
Mr. Saviers' Judgment Of Conviction Decided An Issue Of First Impression And It Is
Inconsistent With A Prior Idaho Court Of Appeals Opinion

A.

Introduction
This Court should grant review because this case presents an issue of first

impression. Additionally, review should be granted because the Opinion is inconsistent
with the Court of Appeals' prior holding in Brandt.

In Brandt, the Court of Appeals

adopted the majority rule which treats multiple felonies which occur in a short period of
time and charged in the same information, as one felony for the purpose of a persistent
violator enhancement. In Brandt, the Court of Appeals adopted this rule then refused to
apply it to the facts of Brandt's case because it determined his prior offenses did not fall
within the ambit of the rule.

In this case, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the

Brandt rule based on its determination that the persistent violator statute, I.C. 19-2514,

and the felony charging enhancement statute for multiplied violations of a no contact
order, I.C. § 18-920, have differing legislative intents. However, the Court of Appeals
noted that it would consider applying the Brandt rule to I.e. 18-920(3) in a case where
the violations of a no contact order occurred on the same day and/or were charged in
the same information.

B.

Standards
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
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Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered
though.

Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be

considered in evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first
impression;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own
prior decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for
the Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.A.R. 118(b). Mr. Saviers argues that this Court should grant review because this case
presents an issue of first impression, and because Court of Appeals' Opinion is
inconsistent with precedent from the Court of Appeals.

C.

When a Defendant Twice Violates A No Contact Order Against The Same Victim
In Rapid Succession And Those Offenses Are Adjudicated At the Same Time
They Should Be Considered One Conviction For The Purposes Of The Felony
Enhancement
There is a line of Idaho Court of Appeals cases which holds that a persistent

violator enhancement is improper in the event a defendant's prior convictions are
entered on the same day or charged in the same information. The policy behind this
rule is to afford

a defendant

time to rehabilitate between convictions and warn the

defendant about the persistent violator statute. Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344. Mr. Saviers
recognizes that this line of cases has, thus far, only been applied to the persistent
violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514, and not to statutes which make felonies out of
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misdemeanors.
considerations are

However, Mr. Saviers argues that the same policy

issue when a defendant commits multiple misdemeanors in a

short period of time, and it makes little sense to afford a criminal that commits multiple
felonies a greater chance for rehabilitation than a person who has only committed
multiple misdemeanors.
The relevant portion of Idaho Code Section 18-920(3) states that "[a]ny person
who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of this section who previously has
pled guilty to or been found guilty of two (2) violations of this section ... shall be guilty
of a felony .... " I.C. § 18-920(3). Similarly, the relevant portion of Idaho Code Section
19-2514 states that "[a]ny person convicted for the third time of the commission of a
felony ... shall be considered a persistent violator of law .... " I.C. § 19-2514. While
interpreting the later statute the Idaho Court of Appeals held, in concert with the majority
of jurisdictions, "that convictions entered the same day or charged in the same
information should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual
offender status." Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344. In Brandt, Brandt escaped from jail while
awaiting sentencing on three separate felonies. Id. at 342. As a result of that escape
from jail, Brandt was convicted of "escape, injury to jail property, assault, and robbery."
Id.

It was also determined that Brandt was a persistent violator, as he had three

previous felony convictions for which he was awaiting sentencing at the time of his
escape.

Id.

at 342-343.

Brandt appealed and argued that the persistent violator

statute was not applicable because the three previous convictions "had been entered in
a single proceeding all on the same day and, as such, the three convictions should be
considered as one conviction for the pu rposes of I. C. § 19-2514." Id. at 343.
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After the Court of Appeals adopted the rule "that convictions entered the same
day or charged in the same information should count as a single conviction for purposes
of establishing habitual offender status," it went on to hold that "the nature of the
convictions in any given situation must be examined to make certain that the general
rule is appropriate." Id. at 344. After examining the nature of Brandt's prior convictions
the Court of Appeals determined that they fall outside of the rule and they were
considered as three separate convictions. Id. In coming to that conclusion, the Court of
Appeals noted that the three prior convictions were charged in separate informations,
involved separate victims, and occurred on different days. Id. The Court also reasoned
that Brandt was initially charged as a persistent violator and since that charge was
dismissed during the prior plea negations he was on notice "about the consequences of
repetitive criminal conduct." Id. Based on the foregoing factors, the Court of Appeals
ultimately held that Brandt "fits well within the scope of I.C. § 19-2514." Id.
In this case, the district court and the Court of Appeals refused to extend the
holding from Brandt to Mr. Saviers' case because it determined that I.C. § 18-920(3)
and I.C. § 19-2514 have differing legislative intents. The Court of Appeals held that this
distinction can be drawn from the plain language of the two statutes. (Opinion, ppA-5.)
According to the Court of Appeals, I.C. § 19-2514 favors rehabilitation and an
opportunity to reform between convictions because the law disfavors life sentences.
(Opinion, pA; 06/18/12 Tr., p.43, Ls.6-16.) Due to this general policy which disfavors
life sentences, "multiple felonies committed on the same day or in the same course of
conduct generally do not result in a persistent violator finding."

(Opinion, pA.) The

Court of Appeals also held that "it is contrary to these rehabilitative considerations and
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fundamental fairness 2 to allow a first time offender to meet the required number of
felony convictions and face potential life in prison as the result of a single criminal
occurrence or course of conduct." (Opinion, p.4.)
The Court of Appeals then held that the plain language of I.C. § 18-920(3) has a
different legislative intent, which punishes repetitive misdemeanor violations harshly
"regardless

of

how

little

time

lapses

between

violations."

(Opinion,

p.4.)

The Court of Appeals provided three policy distinctions between the statutes. First, it
held

that I.C. § 18-920(3) includes a five year timeframe "in which the repeated

violations must occur for the enhanced penalties to apply," which indicates a policy to
punish repeat violators "especially if they are in close in time." (Opinion, p.4.) Second,
it held that since a third violation of I.C. § 18-920(3) does not carry with it the potential
for a life sentence, the "considerations of notice and rehabilitation discussed in Brandt
as being applicable to I.C. § 19-2514 do not apply to I.C. § 18-920(3)."
5.)

(Opinion, pp.4-

Third, it held that, I.C. § 18-902(3) applies only to one class of offenses, i.e.

violations of a no contact order, while I.C. § 19-2514 applies to all classes of felonies.
(Opinion, pp.5.) "This eliminates any considerations of difference in crime and indicates
a policy of more harshly punishing repeated no-contact order violations, which are
usually against the same victim." (Opinion, p.5.)

While not argued below and not contained in prior Court of Appeals opinions, if the
Court of Appeals use of the phrase "fundamental fairness" was meant to invoke due
process protections of the 14th Amendment, Mr. Saviers submits that those same 14th
Amendment due process protections should equally apply to defendants that are facing
felony convictions who violate no contact orders in the same course of conduct.
Mr. Saviers also submits that he did violate the no contact order in the same course of
conduct, similar to the defendant in State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999),
which will be discussed in further detail below.
2
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The Opinion is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals prior holding in Brandt
because it indicated it would potentially apply the Brandt rule if it was presented with
specific circumstances. Specifically, the Court of Appeals noted that Mr. Saviers "did
not allege that the prior violations occurred on the same day or were charged in the
same information. Accordingly, we limit our holding to situations where the judgments
of conviction for violations occurring on different days are entered on the same day."
(Opinion, p.5 n.3.) As mentioned above, the Brandt Court adopted the rule which treats
multiple convictions entered on the same day or charged in the same information as a
single conviction for the purposes of establishing habitual offender status. Brandt, 154
Idaho at 344.

However, the Brandt Court refused to apply that rule to Brandt's prior

convictions because they were charged in separate informations, involved separate
victims, occurred on different days and Brandt was on notice of the persistent violator
statue before he committed his last felony offense.

Id.

Here, the Court of Appeals

refused to apply the Brandt Rule to I.C. § 18-902(3) because it determined that has
I.C. § 18-920(3) has differing legislative intent than I.C. § 19-2514, but, at the same
time, indicated it would apply the Brandt rule if it was presented with a case with the
appropriate fact pattern or procedural posture. In order to be consistent with its holding
in Brandt, the Court of Appeals should have applied the Brandt rule to I.C. § 18-920(3),
then determined whether Mr. Saviers falls within the ambit of the rule.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' determination that it would apply the Brandt
rule to a case where a defendant violated a no contact order multiple times on the same
day, or if the violations were charged in the same information, is inconsistent with its
own holding in the Opinion. The Court of Appeals held that two of the policies behind

12

I.C. § 18-920 is to punish offenders more harshly when they violate no contact order in
a short period of time against the same victim. However, the Court

Appeals held that

defendants that violate no contact orders on the same day should benefit from the
rehabilitative and notice polices behind the Brandt rule.

(Opinion, p.5 n.3.)

It is

inconsistent to hold that the policy behind I.C. 18-920(3) is to punish offenders more
harshly when they violate no contact orders in short periods of time and then hold that
defendants that violate no contact orders multiple times on the same day should get the
benefit from the Brandt rule. Moreover, defendants that violate a no contact order on
the same day <:;Ire most likely to be violating no contact orders against the same victim.
The district court provided its own unique reasoning when it refused to apply the
Brandt rule to I.e. § 18-902(3).

The district court reasoned, in reliance on State v.

Craig, 117 Idaho 983 (1990), and the DUI statute, I.C. § 18-8004, that the policy behind
the misdemeanor charging enhancement statutes are a legislative command intended
to consider three misdemeanors a felony no matter how close in time they are
committed. (06/18/12 Tr., pA3, L.17 - pA5, L.21.)
The district court's reliance on the DUI line of cases is misplaced because DUI
offenders will generally be put on notice about the increasing severity of their
punishments if they continue to drink and drive. When a defendant is being charged
with multiple DUI offenses, there will typically be an intervening arrest between each
DUI, as the evidence for a DUI naturally dissipates due to the body's natural metabolic
processes, see State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 184 (Ct. App. 1995), and, therefore, DUI
offenders are generally arrested between offenses as DUI offenders must be caught in
the act or close to the act, in order for the State to have enough evidence for a

13

conviction When DUI offenders get arrested they go through the booking process and
are warned about the penalties associated with future DUI offenses. In this context, the
notice policy behind the Brandt rule has been satisfied. However, in the context of a
person who violates a no contact order, the evidence does not dissipate and
defendants, like Mr. Saviers, could violate a no contact order many times before an
arrest.

Such offenders should get the benefit of the Brandt rule so they are put on

notice that multiple violations of a no contact order will result in a felony conviction. In
this case, the notice policy of the Brandt rule was not satisfied as the district court made
a factual finding that Mr. Saviers was not on notice that he could be convicted of a
felony for multiple violations of the no contact order. (06/18/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.6-14.)
The district court and the Court of Appeals' refusal to extend the protections of
the Brandt rule to I.C. § 18-920(3) is not consistent with the rehabilitative policy
espoused by the Brandt Court. Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344. It makes little sense to afford
rehabilitative opportunities to a person who commits multiple felonies in a short period
of time and deny the same opportunities to an offender who commits multiple
misdemeanors in a short period of time because misdemeanor offenders pose less of a
risk to society. For example, in State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999), the
Court of Appeals held that Harrington fell within the protections of the Brandt rule where
Harrington was convicted of burglarizing a store on two separate occasions. Id. at 565566. Mr. Saviers' two violations of the no contact order are not an example of great
behavior.

However, Mr. Saviers' offenses are relatively minor when compared to

Harrington's decision to burglarize a store two times. When compared to Harrington,
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Mr. Saviers is a person in a better position to be afforded time to rehabilitate between
offenses.
In the event this Court decides to extend the application of the Brandt rule to
I.C. § 18-920, then the next step is to answer the question of whether Mr. Saviers' prior
convictions fall within the ambit of the rule.

This is a two step process in which

Mr. Saviers must first establish that, procedurally, his two violations were treated as
one. Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344 ("[C]onvictions entered the same day or charged in the
same information should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing
habitual offender status." (emphasis added)). Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344. Mr. Saviers
recognizes that he was separately arraigned on both of the charges. (See generally
06/23/11 Tr.; 07/08/11 Tr.) However, Mr. Saviers entered his guilty plea to both charges
at the same hearing and was sentenced on both on the same day. (10/11/11 Tr., p.79,
Ls.11-18, p.112, Ls.2-24.) Mr. Saviers also recognizes that the convictions for the no
contact orders were file-stamped on separate days. (State's Exhibit 1; State's Exhibit
2.) However, they are virtually identical and they were entered with twenty-four hours of
each other. (State's Exhibit 1; State's Exhibit 2.) Additionally, the district court found
the difference in dates between the file stamps was immaterial.

(06/18/12 Tr., p.30,

L.15 - p.31, LA.) As such, Mr. Saviers' two convictions should be treated as one for the
purposes of the Brandt rule.
The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the nature of the two
convictions are as such that they should be treated as one.

In Brandt, the Court of

Appeals refused to treat Brandt's prior convictions as one, even though the convictions
were entered on the same day, because the offenses occurred on different days,
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involved different victims, occurred in different locations, and Brandt was on notice
about the persistent violator statute prior to his escape.

Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344.

Similarly, in State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals refused
to apply the Brandt rule because the prior offenses were unrelated, occurred on
different dates, and in different counties. Id. at 907. However, the Court of Appeals did
apply the Brandt rule in Harrington, supra, where two prior burglaries involved the same
victim but occurred on different days. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565-566. Even though
Harrington's charges were filed in separate informations, the Court of Appeals
concluded that "Harrington's circumstances fit squarely within the intended scope of
Brandt's general rule." Id. at 565. The Court of Appeals also applied the Brandt rule in
State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337 (Ct. App. 1999), even though there were three children

sexually victimized, because the information did not indicate that the offenses occurred
on different days or in different places. Id. at 339-340.
In this case, the nature of Mr. Saviers' prior convictions are virtually identical to
those of Harrington's prior convictions.

Harrington was arrested while attempting to

burglarize a grocery store. Id. During his interrogation he admitted to burglarizing the
same store ten days earlier. Id. Similarly, Mr. Saviers violated the same no contact
order against the same victim two times over a period of about two weeks. (07/08/11
Tr., pA4, Ls.9-13, pA7, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Saviers' is also in a better position to invoke the
Brandt rule than Clark, who victimized three separate victims, because Mr. Saviers'

crimes against the same victim.

According to the logic of the Harrington Court,

Mr. Saviers squarely fits within the scope of Brandt's general rule.

Finally, and as

mentioned above, the district court made a factual finding that Mr. Saviers was not on
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notice that he could

convicted for a felony for multiple violations of the no contact

order. (06/18/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.6-14.)
In sum, review should be granted because this case presents an issue of first
impression and because the Court of Appeals' Opinion is inconsistent with the holding
and application of the Brandt rule to the facts if Brandt's case.

Moreover, the dual

policies behind the Brandt rule should be extended to protect defendants with prior
violations of no contact orders. This class of defendant is different from DUI offenders
because DUI offenders are generally arrested between offenses and, therefore, put on
notice that future DUI offenses carry increased penalties. Absent such a protection, a
person with no criminal history that makes three phone calls, over three days, in
violation of a no contact order could be charged with a felony for the third call. Such a
defendant should be afforded the protections of the Brandt rule so as to be put on notice
that a future violation of a no contact order would constitute a felony and given the
opportunity to change their behavior. Therefore, the district court erred when it failed to
extend the protections of the Brandt rule to Mr. Saviers.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Saviers respectfully requests that review be granted. In the event review is
granted, Mr. Saviers respectfully requests that this case be remanded for sentencing on
a misdemeanor.
DATED this 25 th day of April, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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